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This paper studies the properties of second-best optimal policy in a standard general 
equilibrium model of growth augmented with renewable natural resources. The government 
chooses its policy instruments (the income tax rate and the allocation of collected tax 
revenues between public investment and environmental policy) to solve a Ramsey-type policy 
problem. The main result is that, the more the citizens care about the environment, the more 
growth-enhancing policies the government finds it optimal to choose in the long run. This is 
because when citizens care about the environment, this requires tax revenues for 
environmental policy and can be only achieved by large tax bases and high growth. Thus, 
only growing economies can afford to care about the environment. This is the case even if 
pollution occurs as a by-product of output produced. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Is economic growth bad for the environment? Environmentalists believe that a 
slowdown in economic activity is needed in order to effectively protect the physical 
environment. Several economists, on the other hand, seem to believe that wealth and 
greenery are positively correlated. What is correct? Is there is a trade-off between 
economic growth and environmental quality? More importantly, should green 
policymakers give priority to environmental policies over growth enhancing policies?  
This paper studies the properties of second-best optimal policy in a standard 
general equilibrium model of growth augmented with renewable natural resources. 
Natural resources are depleted by economic activity, but they can also be maintained 
by environmental policy. The government uses the collected tax revenues to finance 
infrastructure services and environmental policy. The former (i.e. infrastructure 
services) provides production externalities to firms and can be the engine of long-term 
growth as in Barro (1990).
1 The latter (i.e. environmental policy) improves the quality 
of the environment, which enters the households’ utility as a public good.
2 Our work 
differs from the literature mainly because we study the optimal joint determination of 
the size of public sector, as well as the allocation of the collected tax revenues 
between public infrastructure and public cleanup policy in a unified dynamic general 
equilibrium framework.
  
We work as follows. First, we solve for a Competitive Decentralized 
Equilibrium (CDE), which is for any feasible policy. To the extent that private agents 
treat infrastructure and the environment as public goods, the CDE is inefficient and 
this justifies policy intervention. Second, we endogenize policy and solve for a 
General Equilibrium (GE) in which policy (summarized by the income tax rate and 
the allocation of tax revenues between public infrastructure and public environmental 
policy) is chosen optimally by a benevolent government that takes into account the 
CDE. In other words, we solve a Ramsey-type policy problem. Third, we study the 
properties of the resulting GE by distinguishing two cases: first, a non-growing 
economy where there is no long-term growth; second, a growing economy that is 
                                                           
1 Well-known examples of such services are roads, airports, urban development, hospitals, police, etc.  
2 Policies that protect, conserve and generate (via innovation) the natural resources, as well as policies 
that provide the right environmental incentives, are costly activities that require public funds. Note that 
we will use the terms “environmental” and “cleanup” interchangeably.      2
capable of long-term or endogenous growth. In both cases, there is no environmental 
damage so that we solve for what is known as sustainable balanced growth paths. We 
analyse the long run properties and the transitional dynamics in both the non-growing 
and growing economy.    
Our main policy result is as follows. The more the citizens care about the 
environment, the more growth-enhancing policies the benevolent government finds it 
optimal to choose in the long run. Although this sounds paradoxical, it is consistent 
with a general lesson: in a dynamic framework, long-run tax bases are elastic and 
hence the provision of all types of public goods and services becomes fully 
endogenous. Thus, when citizens care about the environment, this requires tax 
revenues for public environmental policies and can be only achieved by large tax 
bases and high growth. Ramsey-type policymakers realize this and choose their policy 
instruments accordingly, in the sense that they give priority to growth. Notice that this 
happens even if environmental damage is modeled as a by-product of output 
produced.  
Therefore, not only there is no tradeoff between economic growth and 
environmental protection in the long run, but also only growing economies can afford 
to improve environmental quality. This is consistent with the empirical evidence of 
e.g. Grossman and Krueger (1995) that there is no evidence that environmental 
quality deteriorates with economic growth (this is better known as “environmental 
Kuznets curve” in the sense that the deterioration of the environment is stopped and 
reversed as income rises). It is also consistent with cross-country reports that wealth 
certainly matters in the sense that per-head income is highly correlated with greenery 
(see e.g. The Economist, January 27
th 2001, pp. 86-89). Finally, it is consistent with 
other theoretical results (see e.g. Philippopoulos and Economides, 2003) that, 
concerning the provision of public goods, many policy lessons may change once one 
moves from static to dynamic frameworks.  
How our work differs? The literature on growth, policy and the environment is 
rich. Since the 1970s, growth models have been studying the optimal use of natural 
resources (see e.g. the surveys by Kolstad and Krautkraemer, 1993; and Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998, chapter 5). More recently, the emphasis has shifted on policy issues 
with the literature reporting mixed results for the effect of environmental policy on 
economic growth (see, among many others, Ploeg and Withagen, 1991; Tahvonen and   3
Kuuluvainen, 1993; John and Pecchenino, 1994; Ligthart and Ploeg, 1994; Bovenberg 
and Smulders, 1995, 1996; and Jones and Manuelli, 2001). Our work differs mainly 
because we study the joint determination of both tax policy and the allocation of 
collected tax revenues between public infrastructure and cleanup policy.
3 Our work 
also differs from most of the environmental literature because here we study 
(Ramsey) second-best optimal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium model of 
growth. Jones and Manuelli (2001) use a model close to ours but they focus on the 
comparison of voting over effluent charges and over direct regulation of technology.   
  The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the economy and solves 
for a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium. Section 3 solves for second-best 
optimal policy and hence a General Equilibrium. A non-growing case is studied in 
Section 4, and a growing case is studied in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are 
gathered in an Appendix.  
 
2.  THE ECONOMY AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
Consider a closed economy populated by private agents (a representative household 
and a representative firm) and a government. Households purchase goods, work and 
save in the form of capital. They get utility from private consumption and the stock of 
natural resources, where the latter is treated as a public good. Firms produce output by 
using private inputs (capital and labor) and public infrastructure. In doing so, they 
pollute the environment. The government imposes taxes on the polluting firm’s 
output,
4 and then uses the collected tax revenue to do two things: to finance public 
infrastructure that basically favors the firm, and to clean up the environment that 
basically favors the household. We build on Barro’s (1990) well-known model so that 
our results are directly comparable to his at any stage of the solution.    
The timing of events is as follows. First, the benevolent government chooses 
economic policy, namely the tax rate as well as the allocation of scarce tax revenues 
between public investment and cleanup policy. Second, private agents make their own 
decisions by taking as given prices, policy and natural resources. These decisions 
(plus cleanup policy) affect residually the motion of natural resources. We will solve 
                                                           
3 Park and Philippopoulos (2004) also study the optimal allocation between public consumption and 
production services, although in a model without natural resources. 
4 Our main results do not change if taxes are imposed on households.   4
the model by backward induction, so that we start from private agents’ problems. We 
assume continuous time, infinite horizons and perfect foresight. We also assume a 
commitment technology on the part of the government so that the government 
chooses policy once-and-for-all by solving a typical Ramsey-type policy problem.   
 
2.1. Household’s  behavior 
The representative infinite-lived household maximizes intertemporal utility given by: 
 





)] , ( [
ρ                                                                                                          (1a) 
 
where  c is private consumption, N  is the stock of economy-wide natural resources 
and the parameter ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference. The utility function  (.) u  is 
increasing and concave in its two arguments, and also satisfies the Inada conditions. 
For simplicity, we use an additively separable and logarithmic utility function: 
 
N c N c u log log ) , ( ν + =                                                                                             (1b) 
 
where the parameter  0 ≥ ν  is the weight given to environmental quality relative to 
private consumption. 
Households can save in the form of capital, a. When they rent out a to firms, 
they receive a rate of return, r . They also supply inelastically one unit of labor 
services so that they get labor income, w.
5 Further, they receive dividends, d , from 
firms. Thus, the flow budget constraint of the representative household is: 
 
d w ra c a + + = +
•
                                                                                                      (2a) 
 
where a dot over a variable denotes time derivative. The initial stock  0 a  is given.  
                                                           
5 We assume away endogenous labor supply to keep the model simple. We believe this is not 
important.      5
The household acts competitively by taking prices, economic policy and 
natural resources as given. The control variables are the paths of c and a, so that the 
first-order conditions are equation (2a) and the familiar Euler condition:   
 
c r c ) ( ρ − =
•
                                                                                                               (2b) 
 
2.2. Firm’s  behavior 
As in the model introduced by Barro (1990), we assume that public services provide 
production externalities to private firms and that technology takes a Cobb-Douglas 
form at the firm’s level. Thus, the production function of the representative firm is:   
 
α α α − − =
1 1 G l Ak y                                                                                                           (3) 
 
where  y  is output produced, k  is the input of physical capital, l is labor input, G  is 
public production services, and  0 > A  and  1 0 < <α  are parameters.   
The representative firm maximizes profits, π :  
 
wl rk y − − − = ) 1 ( τ π                                                                                                    (4) 
 
where  1 0 < <τ  is a proportional tax rate on firms’ output.    
The firm acts competitively by taking prices, economic policy and natural 
resources as given. This is a simple static problem. The control variables are k  and l, 








w τ α − − = 1 1                                                                                                     (5b) 
 
so that profits are zero in equilibrium. 
 
2.3.  Motion of natural resources 
The stock of renewable natural resources, N , evolves over time according to:   6
 
E P N N θ δ + − =
•
                                                                                                               (6) 
 
where the parameter  0 ≥ δ  is the rate of regeneration of natural resources, P  is 
environmental damage (see below), E  is public resources allocated to cleanup policy 
(see below) and the technology parameter  1 0 ≤ ≤θ  measures the effectiveness of 
cleanup policy. The initial stock  0 N  is given. In what follows, and without loss of 
generality, we set  1 ≡ θ . Thus, the idea in equation (6) is that natural resources can be 
renewed by regeneration and public policy.  
We assume that P  is a by-product of final output produced,  y .
6 Specifically, 
 
sy P =                                                                                                                           (7) 
 
that is, one unit of output generates  1 0 < ≤ s  units of pollution. Thus, s is a 
technology parameter that quantifies the detrimental effect of economic activity on 
the environment.  
 
2.4.  Government budget constraint and the role of policy 
On the revenue side, the government taxes the polluting firm’s output at a rate 
1 0 < <τ . On the expenditure side, the government spends on infrastructure, G , and 
cleanup policy, E . Assuming a balanced budget, we have: 
  
y E G τ = +                                                                                                                  (8a) 
 
  Without any loss of generality, we re-write (8a) as: 
 
y b G τ =                                                                                                                      (8b) 
() y b E τ − = 1                                                                                                               (8c) 
where  01 b <≤  is the share of tax revenues that goes to public infrastructure, while 
the rest 0( 1 )1 b ≤−<  is the share that goes to cleanup policy. Inspection of (8a)-(8c) 
                                                           
6 Our main results do not change if pollution is also a by-product of consumption. Alternatively, one 
can model natural resources as an input in private production.   7
reveals that at each instant, economic policy can be fully summarized by the output 
tax rate, τ , and the share of tax revenues that finances public infrastructure, b. 
 
2.5.  Competitive decentralized equilibrium (for any feasible policy) 
We now solve for a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (CDE). In this 
equilibrium: (i) households maximize utility and firms maximize profits; (ii) all 
constraints are satisfied; (iii) all markets clear.
7 This holds for any feasible economic 
policy, where the latter is summarized by the paths of the independent policy 
instruments,  1 0 < <τ  and  1 0 ≤ <b . 
  Combining (1)-(8), it is straightforward to show that a CDE is given by: 
 
() () c b A c ] 1 [
1 1
ρ τ τ α α
α
α − − =
− •
                                                                                     (9a) 






1                                                                                            (9b) 
() [] ()k b A b s N N α
α
α τ τ δ
− •
− − − =
1 1
1                                                                              (9c) 
 
Equations (9a)-(9c) give the motion of consumption (c), capital (k ) and 
natural resources (N ) in a CDE as functions of the independent policy instruments 











 that will be constant in the long run.
8  
Before we endogenize policy, it is helpful to distinguish three possible cases, 






== =≡ , where γ  denotes the balanced growth rate. This is the case of a 
non-growing economy in which the stock of natural resources also remains 
                                                           
7 The market-clearing conditions in the labor, capital and dividend markets are respectively  1 = l , 
a k =  and  d = π . 






. Notice that if 
0 ≡ = s N  and  1 ≡ b , we get Barro’s (1990) model.   8
unchanged.





= == > . This is the case of a 
growing economy in which all quantities (including renewable natural resources) can 
grow at the same positive rate,  0 > γ , in the long run.
10 This can apply to living 
organisms like fish, forests, cattle and to some extent water and atmospheric systems, 
which have a natural capacity to assimilate and cleanse themselves. But, in addition to 
biological regeneration, these resources can also grow in size over time thanks to 
environmental policy and innovation. Innovation can help even fossil fuels (oil, gas, 
etc) and non-energy minerals (copper, bauxite, etc) not to run out in the long run: new 
sources are found, the efficiency of extraction goes up, existing supplies are used 
more economically, and new substitutes are invented (see e.g. The Economist, January 
22
nd, 2005).
11 Third, the case in which consumption and capital can grow at the same 











12   
What are the effects of policy instruments,  1 0 ≤ <b  and  1 0 < <τ , on the 






 monotonically increase with  1 0 ≤ <b . Thus, an increase in the share of tax 
revenues allocated to infrastructure vis-à-vis cleanup leads to better environmental 
quality relative to private capital, 
k
N
. Intuitively, an increase in public investment, 
that stimulates economic growth, γ , and thus increases the tax base, can provide the 
extra tax revenue required to finance green policies. Thus, growth-enhancing policies 
are eventually good not only for growth itself but also for the environment. To put it 
                                                           
9 In this case, (9b) gives 
k
c
 and in turn (9c) gives 
k
N
. We also need restrictions on the policy 
instruments so as  0 γ =  in (9a); see below for further details. 
10 In this case, (9a) gives γ , then (9b) gives 
k
c




11 For renewable and non-renewable natural resources, and their growth capacities in particular, see 
e.g. Perman et al. (2003). 
12 In this case, (9a) gives γ , then (9b) gives 
k
c
 and in turn (9c) gives 
k
N
 (the value of 
k
N
 differs from 
that in case two before).   9
bluntly, once we are in a dynamic world where tax bases are endogenous, 
environmentalists should give priority to economic growth. This is very different 
from static models. Regarding the ratio 
c
N
, this increases with  1 0 ≤ <b  in case (ii), 
while in cases (i) and (iii), the effect of  1 0 ≤ <b  on 
c
N
 is non-monotonic and cannot 
be derived analytically (see Appendix A for details). Finally, the effects of the tax 






 cannot be 
derived analytically (see Appendix A for details). Obviously, equation (9a) implies 
that the growth (γ ) effect of the tax rate has the usual inverted-U pattern, as in Barro 
(1990).  
  We sum up this section. Equations (9a)-(9c) give a unique Competitive 
Decentralized Equilibrium (CDE) for any feasible policy as summarized by τ  and b. 
Note that private agents have failed to internalize externalities. In particular, they 
have not taken into account the positive external effects of public infrastructure and 
have also ignored the adverse external effect of their decisions on the economy’s 
natural resources. Hence, the CDE is inefficient and this justifies policy intervention. 
We will therefore move on to endogenize policy, τ  and b. By choosing τ  and b, the 
government will attempt to control for externalities and also raise funds optimally to 
finance its activities (public infrastructure and cleanup policy). It is worth pointing 
out that both government activities are able to address externalities and hence are 
productive in the standard sense that they improve resource allocation.  
 
3.  SECOND-BEST OPTIMAL POLICY AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
 
To endogenize economic policy, we assume that the government solves a Ramsey-
type policy problem. That is, the government chooses the paths of the income tax rate, 
1 0 < <τ , and the allocation of tax revenues between the two types of policy 
intervention, 01 b <≤ , so as to maximize the household’s welfare in (1a)-(1b) subject 
to the CDE given by (9a)-(9c).  
 
Solution    10
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where  c λ ,  k λ  and  n λ  are dynamic multipliers associated with equations (9a), (9b) 
and (9c) respectively. 
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1 1
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These necessary conditions are completed with the addition of a transversality 
condition that guarantees utility is bounded. A sufficient condition for this to hold is:  
 
                                                           
13 As said above, we assume a commitment technology on behalf of the government so that economic 
policy is chosen once-and-for-all. Thus, we do not study time inconsistency issues.   11
() () ρ δ ρ τ τ α α
α








1 b A                                                                               (11i) 
 












1 b A , plus the 
rate of regeneration of natural resources, δ , should be less than the rate of time 
preference,  ρ .
14 
Following usual practice, and since the model can allow for long-run growth, 
we transform variables to make them stationary.
15 Specifically, after some 






x ≡ ,  k k λ ψ ≡ ,  N n λ φ ≡  
and  c c λ ≡ Ω . Thus, ψ ,  φ  and Ω measure respectively the social value of the 
quantities of physical capital, natural resources and consumption, while  z  and  x are 
the key ratios studied in the CDE above. Then, Appendix B shows that the dynamics 
of (11a)-(11h) are equivalent to the dynamics of (12a)-(12g) below:  
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) 1 )( 1 ( s b − − = α τ                                                                                                      (12f) 
x φ ψ α = + Ω                                                                                                             (12g) 
                                                           
14 If  0 ≥ c λ ,  0 ≥ k λ ,  0 ≥ n λ , and since the objective function and the constraints in (10) are quasi-
concave in τ ,  b ,  c ,  k  and  N , the necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimality in a 
commitment equilibrium. See e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1991). Things are different without 
commitment. 
15 See e.g. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993).    12
 
where (12a)-(12g) constitute a seven-equation system in the time-paths of 
τ φ ψ ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   , b x z Ω . Since (12f) and (12g) are atemporal, the dynamics of b and τ  will 
follow from the dynamics of  x z   ,   ,   , φ ψ  and Ω.  
  Therefore, equations (12a)-(12g) summarize a general equilibrium with 
second-best optimal policy. In what follows, we will study two cases of this economy. 
First, a non-growing economy. This is defined to be a case in which the quantities of 
consumption, capital and natural resources (c,  k  and  N ) do not change in the long 
run. Thus, among other long-run conditions shown below,  0 ckNγ
•• •
== =≡. 
Second, a growing economy. This is defined to be a case in which c, k  and N  grow 
at the same positive constant rate in the long run. Thus, among other long-run 
conditions shown below,  0 ckNγ
•• •
== =>, where γ  is the endogenous balanced 
growth rate. Notice that in both cases we solve for a sustainable balanced growth 
path, in the sense that there is no environmental damage in the long run. Also notice 
that now we cannot solve for a third case in which c and k  grow, but N  does not 
grow.
16 In other words, the general equilibrium (where policy is optimally chosen) is 
more restrictive than the competitive decentralized equilibrium (which was for any 
feasible policy). Recall that the latter allowed for this combined case too (see 
subsection 2.5 above). By contrast, now where policy is optimally chosen, c,  k  and 
N  have to grow at the same rate (zero or positive). Intuitively, since pollution and 
cleanup are proportional to economic activity (see equations (6), (7) and (8c) above), 
the policy-maker finds it optimal to choose his policy so as all quantities grow at the 
same rate. This is the efficient thing to do.   
In what follows, we will study the long run behaviour and the transitional 
dynamics of the two cases defined above. We start with the non-growing case, which 
is simpler algebraically.  
 
4.  CASE A: NON-GROWING ECONOMY 
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This section studies the case in which the economy does not grow in the long run. 
Thus, we set  0 ≡
Ω
Ω
= = = =













 in (11d). We 
will study the properties of this economy both in the long run and along the transition 
path.   
 
4.1.  Long-run solution  
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Equations (13a)-(13g) imply a unique and well-defined non-growing solution. 
In particular, we have:  
 
PROPOSITION 1: If the parameter values satisfy the conditions:  
                                                           
17 See below why we do not make use of (12g) at this stage of the solution.    14
δ ρ >                                                                                                                        (14a) 
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− 1 1
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there exists a unique second-best optimal policy (summarized by 01 τ << %  and 
01 b <≤ % ), which in turn supports a unique sustainable long-run equilibrium in which 
consumption, capital and renewable natural resources remain constant over time. 
This equilibrium is given by equations (13a)-(13g).  
 
Proof: See Appendix C.  
 
Conditions (14a)-(14b) are necessary and sufficient for a solution in (13a)-
(13g) to exist and be well defined. A solution is well defined when  0
~
  , ~   ,
~
  , ~   , ~ > Ω x z φ ψ , 
1
~
  0 < <b  and  1 ~ 0 < <τ . Condition (14c), on the other hand, is required for (12g) to 
hold. This is because, in the case of a non-growing economy, the long run tax rate is 
determined residually by setting (11d) equal to zero, so that an extra condition on the 
parameter values is needed for the first-order condition for the tax rate, (12g), also to 
hold; and this extra condition is provided by (14d).
18  
To confirm the possibility of the above analytical results, we also provide a 
numerical solution.
19 Taking into account the conditions in Proposition 1, we set the 
following benchmark parameter values:  35 . 0 = α  (where  1 0 < <α  is the productivity 
of private capital in the production function),  1 = A  (where  0 > A  is aggregate factor 
productivity in the production function),  015 . 0 = δ  (where  0 > δ  is the rate of 
regeneration of natural resources),  02 . 0 = ρ  (where  0 > ρ  is the rate of time 
preference) and  5 . 0 = s  (where  1 0 < < s  is a technology parameter that quantifies the 
pollution effects of production activity).
20 Then, conditions (14a)-(14b), as well as the 
transversality condition (11i), are all satisfied. Also, equation (14c) implies a value of 
                                                           
18 One could ignore (12g) in the long run. However, since it holds along the transition path, we prefer 
to respect it all the time including the long run. 
19 We use Maple 5.1 for numerical solutions.  
20 Most of these parameters are close to typical values used in the RBC literature or the environmental 
literature. The value of  1 0 < < s  is set at 0.5, which is a rather neutral value.    15
ν  equal to 0.206. Note that we choose to solve (14c) for ν , and not for any other 
parameter value, for two reasons: first, algebraic simplicity;
21 second, and more 
importantly, economic intuition (for details, see below after we complete the study of 
a growing economy). Finally, using all these parameter values, equations (13a)-(13g) 






Notes: 35 . 0 = α ,  1 = A ,  015 . 0 = δ ,  02 . 0 = ρ ,  5 . 0 = s ,  206 . 0 = ν  
 
4.2. Transitional  dynamics 
We now check whether the above long-run equilibrium is dynamically stable. We 
focus on local stability around the long run. Since equations (12f) and (12g) are 
atemporal, linearizing (12a)-(12e) around (13a)-(13g) implies that the local dynamics 

































































J J J J J
J J J J J
J J J J J
J J J J J




x xx x x zx
x z
x z







φ φ φφ ψφ φ
ψ ψ φψ ψψ ψ
φ ψ
                                                               (15) 
 
where the elements of the Jacobian evaluated at the long run are shown in Appendix 
D. 
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix in (15), denoted by  ) det(J , is 
() () δρ δ ρ ρ − − = z z J ~ ~ ) det( , which is negative.
22 Hence, with five eigenvalues, there are 
three possibilities: either all five eigenvalues are negative, or there are three negative 
and two positive eigenvalues, or there is one negative and four positive eigenvalues. 
Since four variables  )   ,   ,   , ( Ω φ ψ z  are forward-looking or jump, and one variable  ) (x  is 
                                                           
21 The value of ν  does not enter equations (12f) and (12g).  
22 This is because  0 ~ < − z ρ . Notice that  ρ α − z ~  is the economy’s growth rate which equals 0. 
Table 1: Non-growing economy 
τ ~   b
~
  z ~   ψ ~  φ
~
  x ~   Ω
~  
54 . 0   60 . 0   057 . 0 7 . 16   3 . 41   42 . 0   29 . 2    16
backward-looking or predetermined, the last possibility (namely, one negative and 
four positive) would imply local determinacy (i.e. saddle-path stability), while the 
first two possibilities (namely, five negative, or three negative and two positive) 
would imply local indeterminacy (i.e. multiple trajectories, each of which is 
consistent with the same initial condition and with convergence to the same steady 
state).
23 By examining the characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix, it is 
straightforward to show in Appendix E that one root is negative and four roots are 
positive. Thus: 
 
PROPOSITION 2:  Under the conditions in Proposition 1, the long-run general 
equilibrium of a non-growing economy is saddle-path stable.   
 
Proof: See Appendix E.  
 
5.  CASE B: GROWING ECONOMY  
 
This section studies the case in which the same economy is capable of long-term, or 
endogenous, growth. Thus, now we set  0 ≡
Ω
Ω
= = = =









 in (12a)-(12g). We 
will again study the properties of this economy both in the long run and along the 






5.1.  Long-run solution   




  , ~ ,
~
  , ~   , ~ ( τ φ ψ b x z Ω . 
Then, when  0 ≡
Ω
Ω
= = = =









, equations (12a)-(12g) give:  
 
                                                           
23 For a review of indeterminacy in macroeconomics, see Benhabib and Farmer (1999). For a related   17
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while τ ~ is a solution to: 
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α                    (16g) 
 
The key equation is (16g) which is an equation in τ ~  only. Once one solves (16g) for 
τ ~, equations (16a)-(16f) can give unique solutions for  ,,, , zx ψφ Ω % % % % %  and b
~
 
respectively. In contrast with the non-growing case above, equation (16g) is a third-
order polynomial which cannot be solved analytically for τ ~; nor it is possible to 
show uniqueness of τ ~. Nevertheless, we manage to establish conditions that are 
sufficient for existence of a well-defined solution, and in turn provide a numerical 
solution to confirm the possibility of such a solution and also study its comparative 
static properties. In particular, we establish:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
public finance general equilibrium paper, see Park and Philippopoulos (2004).     18
PROPOSITION 3: If the parameter values satisfy the conditions:  
() () ( ) () δ ρ ρ α τ α α
α
α − < − − − − <
− 1 1
1 1 ~ 1 0 s A                                                           (17a) 
δ ρ δ 2 < <                                                                                                               (17b) 
() ()() ( ) () () ( ) ()
()() ( ) () () ()() ( ) ()0 1 1 ~ 1 1 1 1 ~ 1                                        
1 1 1 1 ~ 1 1
1 1 1 1
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                                                           (17d)  
there exists at least one second-best optimal policy (summarized by 









), which in turn 
supports a sustainable long-run equilibrium in which consumption, capital and 
renewable natural resources grow at the same positive rate. This equilibrium is given 
by equations (16a)-(16g). 
 
Proof: See Appendix F.  
 
As shown in Appendix F, condition (17a) is sufficient for the growth rate to be 
positive, for the transversality condition in (11i) to hold, and for  0 ~ > ψ . Condition 
(17b) is sufficient for  0
~
> φ . Condition (17c) is sufficient for  0
~
> Ω . Condition (17d) 
is sufficient for existence of equilibrium.
24 
We now solve (16a)-(16g) numerically. To do so, we use the same parameter 
values we used in the non-growing case above (namely, we set  35 . 0 = α ,  1 = A , 
015 . 0 = δ ,  02 . 0 = ρ  and  5 . 0 = s ). We also set  33 . 0 206 . 0 ≤ ≤ν , where recall that a 
                                                           
24 Thus, as in the non-growing case, existence of a well-defined solution requires some extra parameter 
restrictions. It is hard to tell which case (the non-growing or the growing one) is more restrictive.    19
well-defined solution in the non-growing case required  206 . 0 = ν .
25 Table 2 reports 
the solution for changing values of ν , in the region  33 . 0 206 . 0 ≤ ≤ν .
26 In the last two 






% % % , and the balanced growth rate, γ , which is the common rate at which c,  k  
and N  grow (this is derived from (11d) above).   
 
Table 2: Growing economy 
ν   τ ~  b
~
  z ~   ψ ~  φ
~








206 . 0   54 . 0   60 . 0   057 . 0   7 . 16   3 . 41   42 . 0   29 . 2   0241 . 0   0 
21 . 0   538 . 0   603 . 0   057 . 0   69 . 16   5 . 41   42 . 0   22 . 2   0242 . 0   00005 . 0
23 . 0   531 . 0   611 . 0   0577 . 0 69 . 16   03 . 43   40 . 0   77 . 1   023 . 0   0003 . 0  
25 . 0   52 . 0   62 . 0   058 . 0   67 . 16   4 . 44   38 . 0   38 . 1   0225 . 0   0004 . 0  
27 . 0   518 . 0   626 . 0   059 . 0   66 . 16   82 . 45   37 . 0   01 . 1   022 . 0   0009 . 0  
29 . 0   512 . 0   633 . 0   0592 . 0 64 . 16   17 . 47   357 . 0   68 . 0   021 . 0   0011 . 0  
31 . 0   507 . 0   64 . 0   06 . 0   62 . 16   8 . 47   35 . 0   53 . 0   0209 . 0   0014 . 0  
33 . 0   501 . 0   647 . 0   061 . 0   59 . 16   81 . 49   33 . 0   09 . 0   02 . 0   0016 . 0  
Notes:  35 . 0 = α ,  1 = A ,  015 . 0 = δ ,  02 . 0 = ρ ,  5 . 0 = s  
 
As expected, for  206 . 0 = ν , we go back to the non-growing solution in Table 
1. For values of  33 . 0 206 . 0 ≤ <ν , the balanced growth rate (γ ) becomes positive, and 
this growth effect is monotonically increasing in v. Also, the higher is v, the lower is 
the tax rate (τ ) and the higher is the share allocated to infrastructure vis-à-vis cleanup 
(b). Combing results, it follows that the more citizens care about the environment 
(the higher is v), the more growth-enhancing policies the government finds it optimal 
to choose. Intuitively, when citizens care about the environment, this requires extra 
tax revenues for cleanup policy and can be only achieved by large tax bases and high 
growth. Ramsey-type policymakers realize this and choose their policy instruments 
(τ  and b) accordingly. As a result, the higher is eventually the common rate (γ ) at 
which consumption, capital and renewable natural resources can grow.  
                                                           
25 For  206 . 0 < ν , the growth rate becomes negative which is not a well-defined solution because it 
implies that the economy shrinks in the long run. Also, for  33 . 0 > ν , the value of  cc λ Ω≡  becomes 
negative which again is not a well-defined solution with  ,0 c c λ > . 
26 Equation (16g) is a third-order polynomial in τ ~ . However, only one of the three roots is real and 
thus reported here. The transversality condition (11i) is also satisfied.   20






% %  gets. That is, the environment 





follows an inverted-U pattern. That is, for relatively low values of ν , consumption 
rises relative to environmental quality; but after a critical level, as the weight given to 
environmental quality rises, the opposite happens. We believe these are sensible 
comparative static results.  
 
5.2.  Transitional dynamics  
We again focus on local stability around the long run. Since equations (12f) and (12g) 
are atemporal, linearizing (12a)-(12e) around (16a)-(16g) implies that the local 
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                                                               (18) 
 
where the new elements of the Jacobian evaluated at the log-run are shown in 
Appendix G. Working as in subsection 4.2 above, we show:  
 
PROPOSITION 4:  Under the conditions in Proposition 3, a long-run general 
equilibrium of a growing economy is saddle-path stable.  
 
Proof: See Appendix H. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
We studied second-best optimal economic policy in a general equilibrium model of 
endogenous growth augmented with renewable natural resources. Economic policy 
took the form of public infrastructure services and abatement activities financed by 
distorting taxes.    21
Since the main results are written in the Introduction, here we only discuss 
possible extensions. First, it would be interesting to study a richer menu of 
environmental policy instruments. Here, by following common practice, we focused 
on taxes on polluting activities, and in turn cleanup policy financed by the collected 
tax revenues. But environmental management also involves the use of policy tools 
like controls of many sorts, property rights laws, nationalization, etc. For instance, a 
big policy question today - see e.g. the Kyoto protocol - seems to be the debate on 
pollution taxes (i.e. price-based policies) versus pollution limits (i.e. quantity-based 
policies). Second, it is widely believed that the policy focus should shift to cleaner 
technologies. In terms of modeling, adding such technologies would not change our 
main results (in our model, cleanup technology and pollution taxes are expected to be 
substitutes along the optimal policy path). The problem is how to design policies that 
allow market forces to play a role in encouraging private investment and innovation 
in such technologies. We leave these extensions for future research.   
   22
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Study of equations (9a)-(9c) 









, equations (9a) and (9b) give: 
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so that (A.1) and (A.2) give: 
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, (9a) requires: 
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and in turn (9b) and (9c) imply respectively: 
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, (9a) and (9b) give: 
() () () ρ τ τ α α
α
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1 b A b s
k
N
                                                                                   (A.9) 
so that (A.8) and (A.9) imply: 
() [] ()
























b A b s
c
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It is then easy to check that the comparative statics, as written in the text, follow 
(where  () [] τ b s − − 1  is assumed to be positive to have well-defined solutions). 
  
Appendix B: From equations (11a)-(11h) to equations (12a)-(12g) 
Equations (11a)-(11h) in the text constitute an eight-equation dynamic system in 
n k c N k b λ λ λ τ , ,   , , c,   ,   , . By dividing both sides of (11a) and (11b), we get (12f) in the 
text. Next, if we define z
c
k
≡ ,  k k λ ψ ≡ ,  N n λ φ ≡ , 
N
k
x ≡  and  c c λ ≡ Ω , equations 
(11a), (11c), (11d), (11e), (11f), (11g) and (11h) give (12a), (12b), (12c), (12d), (12e) 
and (12g) in the text.  
 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1 
Equation (13c) implies that for  0
~
> φ , we need: 
δ ρ >                                                                                                                        (C.1) 




ρ τ τ α α
α
α b A , where 
1 0 < <α , it follows: 




ρ τ τ α
α
α b A  
Hence, if (C.1) holds, (13b) implies  0 ~ > ψ . 
Equation (13d) implies that for  0 ~ > x , we need: 
s α α τ + − <1 ~                                                                                                           (C.2) 
Equation (13e) implies that for  0
~







                                                                                                           (C.3)   24
Equation (13f) implies that for  1
~
0 < < b , we need: 
() s α α τ − − − > 1 1 ~                                                                                                   (C.4) 
Combining (C.1) and (C.3), and if (C.1) holds, (C.3) is satisfied as well. Combining 
(C.2) and (C.4), we get: 
() s s α α τ α α + − < < − − − 1 ~ 1 1                                                                                (C.5) 
Combining (C.5) and (13g) in the text, we get: 




α α α α ρ α α
− −
− − − + < < − − −
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 s A s s s A s                  (C.6) 
Finally, (12g) implies that the following condition must hold: 










− − − − −
− 1 1
2 1 1 1 s A s                                                    (C.7)                              
Conditions (C.1), (C.6) and (C.7) are respectively (14a), (14b) and (14c) in the text.  
 
Appendix D: The Jacobian in equation (15) 
The elements of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state are: 
0 ~ > = z J zz ,  0 = z Jψ , 0 = z Jφ , 0 = xz J ,  0 = Ωz J , 0 ~ < − = ψ ψ z J , 0 ~ < − = z J ρ ψψ , 
0 > =δ φψ J ,  () [] () 0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1
1 1
> − − =
−
φ τ τ α
α
α
ψ b A b s J x , 0 = Ωψ J , 0 = φ z J , 0 = ψφ J , 
0 > − = δ ρ φφ J ,  () [] () 0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1
1 1
< − − − =
−
φ τ τ α
α
α
φ b A b s J x , 0 = Ωφ J , 0 ~ < − = x J zx , 
0 = x Jψ ,  0 = x Jφ , 0 > =δ xx J , 0 = Ωx J ,  0 ~ > = Ω ψ z J ,  0 ~ > = Ω z Jψ ,  0 = Ω φ J , 
0 = Ω x J ,  0 > = ΩΩ ρ J . 
 
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 2 
The characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian in (15) evaluated at the steady state is: 
() ( )( )() ( ) 0 = − − − − − ΩΩ J J J J J xx zz ε ε ε ε ε φφ ψψ                                                      (E.1) 
where ε  is an eigenvalue and where  zz J ,  ψψ J ,  φφ J ,  xx J ,  ΩΩ J  are given in Appendix 
D above. Then, equation (E.1) implies four positive and one negative roots. Since four 
variables are jump (z , ψ ,  φ  and Ω) and one variable is predetermined ( x), this 
gives local determinacy (i.e. saddle-path stability). 
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Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 3 
Equation (16c) implies that for  0
~
> φ , we need: 




δ τ τ α α
α
α b A                                                                                       (F.1) 
Given (F.1), equation (16b) implies that for  0 ~ > ψ , we need: 
() () 0 ~ ~ ~ 1
1 1




α τ τ α δ ρ b A                                                                                 (F.2) 
Equation (16d) implies that for  0 ~ > x , we need: 
s α α τ + − <1 ~                                                                                                            (F.3) 
Equation (16e) implies that for  0
~
> Ω , we need:  
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                                                                                                                                  (F.4) 
Equation (16f) implies that for  1
~
0 < < b , we need: 
() s α α τ − − − > 1 1 ~                                                                                                    (F.5) 
For the growth rate to be positive we need: 




ρ τ τ α α
α
α b A                                                                                       (F.6) 
For the transversality condition in (11i) to hold, we need: 
() () δ ρ ρ τ τ α α
α
α − < − −
− 1 1
~ ~ ~ 1 b A                                                                                (F.7) 
Equation (F.7), given that (F.6) holds, implies that: 
δ ρ >                                                                                                                         (F.8) 
If (F.8) holds and also the growth rate is positive (see condition (F.6)), then (F.1) is 
satisfied as well. Also, if: 
δ ρ 2 <                                                                                                                      (F.9) 
then, if (F.7) holds, (F.2) is always satisfied.  
Combining, (F.6) and (F.7), we get (17a) in the text. Combining (F.8) and (F.9) we 
obtain (17b) in the text. Finally, (F.4) is (17c) in the text.  
Therefore, if (17a), (17b) and (17c) in the text hold, the tax rate(s), τ ~, and the 
allocation(s) of tax revenues between infrastructure and cleanup, b
~
, as well as the   26
associated SBGP(s), will be well defined (given existence of a solution). In particular, 
by combining (F.3) and (F.5), we get that τ ~ must lie within the region: 
() s s α α τ α α + − < < − − − 1 ~ 1 1                                                                              (F.10) 
and b
~










                                                                                              (F.11) 
We now check existence of such an equilibrium. To do so, we study (16g) in the text. 
Let define as  ) ~ (τ L  and  () τ ~ R  the left- and the right-hand side of (16g) respectively. 









Hence, by combining all these, a sufficient condition for existence is  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( R L > , 
which is (17d) in the text. 
 
Appendix G: The Jacobian in equation (18) 
The elements of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state are: 
0 ~ > = z J zz , 0 = z Jψ , 0 = z Jφ , 0 = xz J ,  0 = Ωz J , 0 ~ < − = ψ ψ z J , 0 ~ < − = z J ρ ψψ , 
() () 0 ~ ~ ~ 1
1 1





φψ τ τ α δ ρ b A J ,  () [ ] () 0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1
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φ τ τ α
α
α
ψ b A b s J x , 0 = Ωψ J , 
0 = φ z J ,  0 = ψφ J ,  () () 0 ~ ~ ~ 1
1 1
> − − =
−
δ τ τ α α
α
α
φφ b A J ,  () [ ] () 0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1
1 1
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−
φ τ τ α
α
α
φ b A b s Jx , 
0 = Ωφ J , 0 ~ < − = x J zx , 0 = x Jψ , 0 = x Jφ ,  () () 0 ~ ~ ~ 1
1 1




α τ τ α δ ρ b A J xx , 
0 = Ωx J ,  0 ~ > = Ω ψ z J ,  0 ~ > = Ω z Jψ ,  0 = Ω φ J , 0 = Ω x J ,  0 > = ΩΩ ρ J . 
 
Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 4 
The characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian in (18) evaluated at the steady state is: 
() ( )( )() ( ) 0 = − − − − − ΩΩ J J J J J xx zz ε ε ε ε ε φφ ψψ                                                     (H.1) 
where ε  is an eigenvalue and where  zz J ,  ψψ J ,  φφ J ,  xx J ,  ΩΩ J  are given in Appendix 
G. Then, equation (H.1) implies four positive and one negative roots. Since four 
variables are jump (z , ψ ,  φ  and Ω) and one variable is predetermined ( x), this 
gives local determinacy (i.e. saddle-path stability).    27
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